This essay interrogates the ontology of attraction, arguing for its conceptualization not as an intrinsic property, but as a contingent, dynamic, and intersubjective event. It dismantles the “vulgar” property-based model and critiques the epistemological failure of trait-based models, which mistake correlation for cause and fail to account for desire’s singularity. In their place, this essay proposes a dynamic, rhizomatic model: a true schizoanalysis of the event. Attraction is posited as an assemblage (agencement) formed from the immanent, positive engine of Productive Force (Ελκυστικός / Charm-as-Flow). This engine is then captured, coded, and repressed by the representational strata of the Imaginary (Όμορφος / Beauty-as-Form) and the Symbolic (Ωραίος / Pleasingness-as-Code). This act of capture, in turn, produces the Lacanian Real (Desirability-as-Lack) not as a competing engine, but as a repressive inversion—a “negative image” or symptom of desire’s stratification. The value of this heuristic is its capacity to map the process (force deterritorializing strata) and the tensions (Imaginary perfection versus the Real “stain”) that constitute the event, providing a rigorous cartography of desire as a productive force and the “Lack” it is tragically forced to mime.

1. Introduction: The Ontological Error

In the vulgar lexicon, attraction is treated as a property. An object or person “is” attractive, possessing an intrinsic, quantifiable quantum of a quality. This formulation is a foundational ontological error. It reifies a complex, intersubjective relation into a static, objective attribute. The phenomenon of attraction is irreducible to any such list of traits, for it is not a possession but an event. It is an event constituted entirely by the gaze of another—a gaze that is itself structured by a vast, contingent personal and social history.

Existential phenomenology first established this relational ontology. Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, argued that the subject’s fluid, for-itself potential (pour-soi) is fixed, objectified, and “petrified” by the Look (le regard) of the Other (Sartre, 1956). To be “seen” is to be constituted as a being-for-others (être-pour-autrui). Attraction, in this light, is a particular, powerful valorization of this objectification—a moment where the subject’s alienation in the Other’s gaze is affirmed as desirable.

Psychoanalytic theory radicalizes this. Jacques Lacan’s dictum, “desire is the desire of the Other,” carries a crucial double meaning: our desires are never ours but are shaped by what we perceive the Other desires, and we fundamentally desire to be the object of the Other’s desire (Lacan, 2006). To label something “attractive,” therefore, is merely to describe a complex relational configuration. The central philosophical problem is to move beyond a simple inventory of what is deemed attractive and to delineate the structural grammar of the event itself. This requires a true schizoanalysis of the event, mapping the immanent process of productive desire and the strata that capture it.

2. The Problem: The Epistemological Failure of the Trait-Inventory

The dominant scientific paradigm for attraction, particularly evolutionary psychology, operates on the logic of the trait-inventory. This approach proposes that “attractiveness” can be calculated, or at least statistically predicted, by summing a list of legible qualities: facial symmetry, waist-hip ratio, resource indicators, social status, and so on (Buss, 1989).

While these factors are not irrelevant, their explanatory power is epistemologically shallow. They function as statistical correlations, not as causal explanations for any singular event of desire. This “actuarial” model of attraction fails on two critical counts:

1. It Fails to Explain Specificity: It cannot answer the fundamental question: why this person, for this subject, at this precise moment? The statistical norm (e.g., a preference for symmetry) cannot account for the radical specificity of desire, which so often fixates on a non-normative, idiosyncratic detail.
2. It Confuses Map and Territory: It mistakes the observable traits for the underlying cause. It cannot account for the attraction to a flaw, the magnetic pull of an unconventional style, or the charm of an idea that defies social norms. It mistakes the strata—the sedimented, observable representations—for the process of desire itself.

These models, in their attempt to build a “physics” of attraction, reduce a dynamic, singular event to a static checklist. They are maps of the territory after it has already been captured, coded, and stratified by social and biological forces. They cannot map the event as it happens. To do so, we must delineate the underlying modalities that allow any given trait—or any given flaw—to become significant in the first place.

3. The Field of Representation: The Lacanian Strata of Capture

Any event of attraction occurs within a pre-existing field of representation. An object is never perceived tabula rasa; it is immediately “traced” and stratified by the subject’s symbolic and imaginary frameworks. These strata do not animate desire; they capture, code, and repress it.

Modality 1: The Imaginary Register (Όμορφος / Beauty-as-Form)

The first modality of capture is the Imaginary order, which operates on the logic of form, harmony, and wholeness. Its Greek correlate is Όμορφος (Omorphos), rooted in μορφή (morphē), or form. This is the beauty of the specular image—the “good” form that provides narcissistic satisfaction by masking the subject’s underlying fragmentation (Lacan, 2006). This register corresponds to the Lacanian ego-ideal, the idealized, static image of completeness against which the ego measures itself. Attraction in this register is an appeal to a non-threatening, harmonious stasis: the perfectly symmetrical face, the balanced composition, the flawlessly executed mathematical proof. It is the gratification of the ego in a mirror.

Modality 2: The Symbolic Register (Ωραίος / Pleasingness-as-Code)

The second modality of capture is the Symbolic order, which operates on the logic of social code and law. Its correlate is Ωραίος (Ōraios), whose etymological root is ὥρα (hōra), meaning “hour,” “season,” or “the right time.” This is not the beauty of form, but the “pleasingness” of aptness and timeliness within a specific socio-temporal context. Its locus is the Symbolic order, the realm of language, law, and social convention (Fink, 1995). To be “attractive” in this register is to successfully embody the mandates of the “big Other”—the unwritten rules that govern a given social field. This includes demonstrating social grace, conforming to dress codes, possessing the correct credentials, and mastering the appropriate cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). It is attraction as conformity and legibility.

These two strata, the Imaginary and the Symbolic, constitute the static field of representation. They describe a world of images and laws, a “dead” world of pure structure. They can explain why a subject might approve of an object, but they cannot explain the animating force of desire itself.

4. The Engine of Desire (Production) and its Stratified Inversion (Lack)

The event of attraction is animated by a single, immanent force. The central thesis of this schizoanalysis is that the conflict is not between two “engines,” but between the one true engine of desire and the representational strata (I, S) that repress it. This repression, in turn, produces the illusion of a central void.

Modality 3: The Deleuzian Engine: Ελκυστικός as Force (Production)

The sole engine of attraction is Productive Desire. This is the Deleuzo-Guattarian counter-thesis: desire does not lack; desire produces. It is a “desiring-machine,” a positive, productive flow of affects and intensities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Its correlate is Ελκυστικός (Elkystikós), “charm,” rooted in the Greek ἕλκω (hélkō), “to pull or draw in.”

This modality is not a representation; it is a positive, affective force. It is the perceived agency, charisma, or intensity of the object itself. It is the “charm” of a performer, the “compelling voice” of a leader, or the “focused intensity” of an intellectual. This engine is not a void in the subject but a productive flow from the object that connects with the observer to form an assemblage (agencement). It is the efficacy of one desiring-machine to “plug in” to another, creating new flows of affect that operate productively, beyond (and often against) mere representation. This is the primary, molecular, nomadic process of desire.

Modality 4: The Lacanian “Engine”: Desirability as Lack (The Repressive Effect)

This framework’s critical move is to re-situate Lack. The Lacanian conception of desire as a constitutive lack is not, from this perspective, a co-equal ‘engine’ at all. It is a consequence, not a cause.

The “stain” in the Real—the objet petit a (Lacan, 1977)—is the negative image or symptom that appears only after the positive, productive flows of desire (Modality 3) have been dammed up, coded, and stratified by the Imaginary and Symbolic (Modalities 1 & 2). Lack is the phenomenological experience of desire for a neurotic subject already constituted by repression. The objet a (a flaw, a gaze, a scar) becomes “Desirable” because it is the “bit of the Real” that marks the failure of the strata to perfectly capture desire. It is the effect of repression, the “void” that is produced in the subject by the social machine.

This resolves the model’s central antagonism. The conflict is not between two equal-but-opposite forces (Production vs. Lack). It is the fundamental conflict between desire itself (Modality 3: Production) and the representational apparatus (Modalities 1 & 2) that represses it. This apparatus of capture, in turn, produces the tragic illusion of a central, structural void (Modality 4: Lack) as its primary symptom.

5. Synthesis: Attraction as Rhizomatic Assemblage

By abandoning a static “grid” and identifying Production as the sole engine, we can deploy a more powerful analytical tool: the assemblage. An attraction-event is not a point, but a rhizomatic connection that cuts across the modalities. Its analytic power is demonstrated by re-reading key phenomena as maps of this capture and escape.

Tension 1: The Uncanny Valley (Imaginary vs. Real)

The “uncanny valley” (Mori et al., 2012) serves as a powerful illustration of this model. When an artificial object (a CGI character) approaches, but does not achieve, perfect human likeness, it becomes repulsive.

Our framework reads this as the horror of total stratification. Maximizing Όμορφος (Imaginary perfection) creates an image of static, sterile completeness. This perfection annihilates desire by foreclosing all possibility of a productive flow (Modality 3) or a “flaw” (Modality 4) that would mark an escape. The “perfection” is repulsive because it is the ultimate capture, a “Body without Organs” that has become a cancerous, dead totality, eliminating the idiosyncratic “stain” of the Real that signals life.

Tension 2: The Halo Effect (Force vs. The Strata)

The “halo effect” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) is the model’s clearest example of desire escaping capture. It is the deterritorialization of the strata by force.

In our model, a powerful, molecular flow of Ελκυστικός (Modality 3: Force/Charm) overwhelms and reframes the molar, static strata. A charismatic speaker does not just “seem” nice; their affective flow actively deterritorializes the observer’s Symbolic and Imaginary codes (Modalities 1 & 2). Their radical, anti-Symbolic message is re-coded as “correct,” and their average physical appearance is re-coded as “beautiful.” Force is not just another trait; it is the immanent process that transforms the subject’s perception of all other traits.

Composite Assemblages

This model allows us to describe complex social attributes as specific assemblages of capture and flow:

• “Social Power” is often an assemblage of high Ελκυστικός (Force) that has been successfully captured and reterritorialized by the Symbolic order (Ωραίος / Code). The leader’s charisma (a productive flow) is validated by, and channeled into, their credentials (a static code).
• “Rarity” (Worchel et al., 1975) is a market condition that functions as an amplifier for the experience of Lack. It does not create desire, but it powerfully intensifies an object’s potential to be perceived as the singular, non-substitutable objet a (Modality 4), thus intensifying the symptom of repression.

6. Conclusion: A New Cartography of the Event

Attraction is not a simple quality to be possessed, measured, or inventoried. It is a complex, singular, and contingent event.

We have dismantled the vulgar “property” model as an ontological error and the scientific “trait” model as an epistemological failure. In their place, we have proposed a dynamic, schizoanalytic heuristic. It is built on the fundamental modalities of subjective experience: the representational strata of capture (the Imaginary and the Symbolic) and the one, immanent, productive engine of desire (Force/Charm). This engine, when captured by the strata, produces the phenomenological effect of a structural, negative Lack (the Real).

This framework abandons the static grid for a rhizomatic map of assemblages. It provides a rigorous and nuanced language to describe one of human experience’s most fundamental phenomena. It does not tell us what to desire, nor does it predict the next event. Its value is analytical. It provides a powerful cartography for understanding how the singular, immanent force of desire (Production) is captured by the strata of representation, and how this very capture produces the tragic, theological illusion of a central, structural lack that organizes the neurotic subject.

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